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Listening to Luddites: Innovation Antibodies and Corporate Success
“One of the most important ways to start your organization down the 
innovation road is to honor those who naturally want to speak truth to power, even 
if they feel infuriating to deal with.”
                                                         ~Francis Horibe~
1. Introduction
Regardless of corporate size or industry, innovation is an essential activity 
of every organization in the modern global marketplace (Hamel, 2002). A steady 
stream of fresh, new ideas is the foundation of innovation.  Organizational change 
is hindered by the presence of innovation antibodies (Lawrence, 1969). Some 
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Protracted innovation is an essential activity of every organization in the 
modern global marketplace and is fueled by a continuous stream of fresh ideas. 
Contemporary business literature decries the innovation antibody, employees who 
intentionally thwart the acquisition and dissemination of crucial new ideas.   The 
business press posits but one uniform type of innovation antibody often unwittingly 
encouraged by corporate actions, and should be quickly and effectively neutralized. 
This paper asserts that, like biological antibodies in the human body, the work of 
innovation antibodies in the corporate body can be either positive or negative. It is true 
that recalcitrant negative innovation antibodies determined to slow or eliminate 
innovation must be excised from the organization. Positive innovation antibodies are 
important to organizational sensemaking and innovation activities, and should not be 
suppressed or overcome. A revised innovation sequencing model is put forth to guide 
the activities of positive innovation antibodies, as are specific actions recommended for 
organizations to encourage the appropriate growth and use of positive innovation 
antibodies to effect corporate innovation success.
 contend that one well-placed innovation antibody can quietly reinterpret corporate 
strategies to co-workers and ultimately wreak havoc on the corporation’s future 
(Kelley, 2005). Contemporary business literature decries the innovation antibody, 
also referred to as an organizational antibody or devil’s advocate, asserting that 
innovation antibodies routinely thwart the acquisition and dissemination of crucial 
new ideas (Sutton, 2002). Moreover, the business press posits that there is one 
uniform type of innovation antibody, that organizations unwittingly encourage the 
proliferation of negative innovation antibodies, that innovation antibodies have a 
devastating effect on innovation and the viability of the organization, and that all 
innovation antibodies should be effectively neutralized (Skarzynski & Gibson, 
2008). 
This paper asserts there to be  many  types of innovation antibodies, 
delineated primarily by their motivations and methods. In addition, innovation 
antibodies resemble biological antibodies in many ways—too many or unfocused 
innovation antibodies are injurious to the body (negative antibodies), whereas the 
right number and proper focus of antibodies (positive antibodies) is critical to the 
sustenance of idea generation, the proper vetting of those ideas, and initiation of 
organizational innovation. Positive innovation antibodies ultimately determine 
corporate viability. The role of positive innovation antibodies in organizational 
sensemaking and innovation activities is considered, and an innovation sequencing 
model most likely to utilize positive innovation antibodies is reviewed. The paper 
concludes with specific recommended actions to develop an environment that 
encourages the appropriate growth and use of positive innovation antibodies 
toward the goal of corporate innovation success.
2. Contemporary Views of Innovation Antibodies
“Antibody”  is typically used in reference to an important biological 
process within the human body. The first known usage of the term “antibody” 
occurred in a German text by Paul Ehrlich.  Ehrlich used the term antikörper (the 
German word for antibody) in the conclusion of his article "Experimental Studies 
on Immunity", published in October 1891, which stated that "if two substances 
give rise to two different antikörper, then they themselves must be different" 
(Lindenmann, 1984). Antibodies are gamma globulin proteins found in the blood 
and other bodily fluids of vertebrates. Their fundamental role is to identify and 
neutralize foreign invaders, including bacteria and viruses.  
An innovation antibody is a malcontent employee who may effectively 
shortstop corporate innovation (Oster, 2008d, 2008e). Innovation antibodies are 
considered  the  greatest  threat  to  innovation  in  the  modern   era,  and,  when 
considering change, innovation antibodies only see the downside, the problems, the 
disasters-in-waiting (Kelley, 2001). The more radical the innovation and the more 
it challenges the status quo, the more and stronger are the antibodies (Davila, 
Epstein, & Shelton, 2006).  Complacency engendered by historical successes of the 
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antibodies (Davila et al., 2006). 
Before reviewing the characteristics of “typical” innovation antibodies, it is 
important   to   consider   the   behaviors   intentionally   or   mistakenly   labeled   as 
resistance. A person who exhibits an unusual personality or disagrees with 
company policies or methodologies is not necessarily an innovation antibody 
(Hirshberg, 1998). “Background resistance,” such as foot dragging, failing to 
follow procedures, being late for or missing meetings, complaining, gossiping, 
failing to perform, and so forth, are common behaviors found in all organizations 
and do not necessarily indicate the presence of innovation antibodies (Caruth, 
Middlebrook, & Rachel, 1985; Ford & Ford, 2009). Personal qualities that often 
accompany the ability to successfully innovate—passion, drive, out-of-the-box 
thinking—are often viewed as arrogance, unreasonableness, and uncompromising 
behavior in some organizations (Horibe, 2001). Innovation antibodies similarly are 
not employees who seem wayward but actually have received insufficient or 
incomplete training or instructions (Fournies, 1988). “Innovation antibodies” does 
not refer to those who loudly and dramatically disrupt company operations. These 
are considered “saboteurs,” from the French “sabot,” a wooden sandal worn by 
workers and intentionally thrown into machinery to wreck its functionality. 
Interestingly, approach-avoidance theory (Knowles & Linn, 2004a) posits that 
people can be simultaneously for (approach) and against (avoid) change.  Because 
of the relentless pressure to perform in modern organizations, virtually  every 
person  consciously   or   inadvertently   resists   change   at   one   time   or   another 
(Lawrence, 1969).
Innovation antibodies are not just non-supporters (Gatignon & Robertson, 
1989; Herbig & Day, 1992; Ram & Sheth, 1989).  Instead, they possess numerous 
motivations and demonstrate a continuum of methods for engaging change—from 
passively resisting it, to aggressively trying to undermine it, to sincerely embracing 
it (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008; Piderit, 2000). Outspoken critics of change in an 
organization are often those who care most deeply about corporate success and are 
cognizant enough of the inner machinations of the organization to recognize the 
potential pitfalls (Ford & Ford, 2009; Lawrence, 1969). By wrongly assuming that 
resistance is necessarily bad, corporate leaders often miss potential contributions 
toward eliminating unnecessary, impractical, or counterproductive elements in the 
innovation efforts.  Pain in the human body caused by the actions of biological 
antibodies does not tell what is wrong, only that something is wrong.  It is likewise 
spurious  to  try  to  overcome   resistance  in  the  corporate  body without  first 
diagnosing the specific ailment (Lawrence, 1969). Because of the varied ways in 
which individuals and groups can react to change, correct assessments often are not 
intuitively obvious and require careful thought (Gatignon & Robertson, 1989; 
Herbig & Day, 1992; Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008; Ram & Sheth, 1989; Rogers, 
2003).
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being “irrational,” based on the assumption that innovation antibodies result from a 
lack of knowledge, motivation, consideration, or ability, and that subjects always 
face a clear choice between acceptance/compliance and resistance (Brunsson, 
1986). It is presumed that corporate leaders are doing the right and proper things 
while innovation antibodies throw up unreasonable obstacles or barriers to thwart 
proposed innovation (Dent & Goldberg, 1999). Innovation antibodies are virtually 
never shown to exhibit rationally coherent strategies and objectives (Jermier, 
Knights, & Nord, 1994). Portrayal of personal and organizational change resistance 
as   uniformly   dysfunctional   ignores   substantive   research   demonstrating   that 
authentic dissent has been shown to be functional in other areas of management 
(Nemeth, Brown, & Rogers, 2001; Nemeth, Connell, Rogers, & Brown, 2001) and 
that innovation antibodies may serve as an asset and a vital resource in the 
implementation of successful corporate innovation (Knowles & Linn, 2004b, 
2004c).
During periods of fiscal exigency, corporate innovation efforts may be 
associated with greater urgency, pressure, and risk than are organizational activities 
in more tranquil times (Kotter, 1995).   Corporate leadership may be more 
frustrated by and less tolerant of behavior exhibited by employees and customers 
(Caruth et al., 1985), and may become competitive, defensive, or uncommunicative 
(Ford & Ford, 2009).  Moreover, leaders may label a broad range of behavior as 
indicative of resistance to innovation efforts, and may consider such behavior as 
justification for operating in different and potentially more aggressive ways toward 
employees to signal that the behaviors are not aligned with the innovation process 
and are therefore unacceptable.  
3. Corporate Encouragement of Negative Innovation Antibodies
Innovation antibodies thrive in an environment of uncertainty, doubt, 
weakness,   and   fear   (Carlson   &   Wilmot,   2006).   Individual   behavior   and 
institutional infrastructure intentionally resist the instability of change (Oster, 
2008d; Stacey, 1996; Taylor, Wacker, & Means, 2000). Innovation resistance 
rarely arises because of technical factors, but because of social and human 
considerations (Berkun, 2007; Lawrence, 1969). In many instances, innovation 
antibodies stealthily move in such an environment to accomplish their own goals 
(Bossidy & Charan, 2004; Oster, 2008e; Stacey, 1996). Corporations aid and abet 
innovation antibodies by rewarding employees for their allegiance to the historical 
past of the company (Lawler & Worley, 2006; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000). Employee 
commitment to historical decisions demonstrates the desirable traits of consistency 
and persistence, reaffirms the organization’s social identity, and limits possible loss 
of valuable personal or corporate assets and benefits (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008). 
Employees resist change because they are comfortable with the historical trajectory 
and habits of the organization and in their complacency resist all innovation 
(Grieskiewicz, 1999; Sheth, 1981). Those who choose to engage in innovative 
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2007; Horibe, 2001; Sutton, 2002). Earlier innovation failure causes sanctions to be 
applied to new innovative efforts to limit possible corporate damage (Ford & Ford, 
2009), may promote ongoing skepticism and cynicism (Beer et al., 1990), and 
inoculates employees, thereby increasing their immunity to future innovation 
efforts (McGuire, 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961; Tormala & Petty, 2004). 
Perhaps the most common support network for negative innovation antibodies is 
weak and unfocused corporate leadership. Leaders who consider innovation as 
inefficient and a waste of corporate resources often provide tepid support to those 
who innovate, and employees lack trust in leadership support of innovation efforts 
(Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008). The commitment of leaders to the innovation process 
may be temporary, and the internal corporate market for creativity and innovation 
may   be   opaque   or   non-existent   (Davila,   et.   al.,   2006).   Leaders   may   use 
inappropriate or imprecise language in their transmission of innovation objectives 
(Fournies, 1988; Lawrence, 1969). Negative innovation antibodies thrive in such 
an environment and quickly overrun all new innovation initiatives (Kelley, 2005). 
4. Damage By Negative Innovation Antibodies
In   the   hyper-competitive   global   economic   environment,   protracted 
innovation is a matter of corporate viability (Davila et al., 2006; Gryskiewicz, 
1999). The personal compensation and tenure of corporate leaders are often tied 
directly to the development of a consistently innovative organization by Boards of 
Directors (Oster, 2008a).  The foundation of innovation is the new, the unusual, the 
unique ideas developed by employees, customers, and others (Hamel, 2002). While 
both the development of internal innovation capabilities and an environment for 
protracted innovation success are essential to the survival of every modern 
corporation, the business press often portrays the lifework of every innovation 
antibody as the thwarting of that effort (Kelley, 2005; Oster, 2008d; Sutton, 2002). 
The success of innovation antibodies intimidates other employees (Dundon, 2002), 
and causes employees to hide their insights (Kotter, 1995). The motivations, 
methods, and outcomes of innovation antibodies are usually considered to be 
homogenous, and are detailed hereafter: 
· Derail   Change  –   The   fundamental   descriptor   of   an   innovation 
antibody is the ability to spell out instantly dozens of reasons why a 
new idea or corporate action will fail, but the uniform inability to 
provide any alternatives that might help them succeed (Kelley, 2005: 
Oster,   2008d,   2008e;   Sutton,   2002).   New   ideas   for   products, 
procedures, or organizational configurations are harshly met with 
historical tales of similar earlier attempts and the untimely demise of 
those who championed them (Berkun, 2007). Negative innovation 
antibodies vehemently attack ideas in their most rough concept or 
prototype stage to ensure that they never garner enough support to 
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method used by innovation antibodies is to push for the absolute 
elimination of the possibility of failure: before something new is tried 
its ultimate success must be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt 
(Heifetz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009; Martin, 2004, 2005; Oster, 2008b, 
2009a).  
· Quietly Erode Corporate Communications – Most texts generalize 
the insidiousness of innovation antibodies is due to their working “off 
radar,” evidenced only in projects  not done on time, done poorly, or in 
need of rework (Horibe, 2001). Their power comes  from being 
undetectable to superiors. In fact, innovation antibodies often curry the 
favor of superiors, even eagerly volunteering publically for the very 
projects they effectively secretly thwart. Innovation antibodies are 
particularly adept at “malicious obedience.” As the term implies, 
malicious obedience occurs when preliminary plans for a new product, 
strategy, or program is unveiled by corporate leadership, and the 
innovation antibody possesses information necessary to make those 
plans effective. By participating in the plan “by the book,” the 
innovation antibody gains substantial strength when the plan ultimately 
fails (Oster, 2008e).  
· Proceduralize Progress – Experts assert innovation antibodies never 
publicly challenge innovation efforts “head-on,” but instead quietly 
influence and take control of the development of corporate policies and 
procedures surrounding innovation practices (Oster, 2008d).  Burying 
innovation practices in convoluted policies and procedures slows 
innovation so that it finally experiences death by inertia.    
· Ignore Customer Needs  – The business press also opines that the 
focus   of   a   corporate   antibody   is   ever   inward   to   the   internal 
machinations of the organization (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000). According 
to innovation antibodies, contemporary decisions related to innovation 
must perfectly align with the historical trajectory of the company, 
regardless of current changes in customer needs, the competitive 
environment, or economic marketplace (Davila et al., 2006). For the 
innovation antibody, the company will exist in its present state forever 
and   the   external   environment   (including   current   and   prospective 
customers) is caustic or irrelevant (Argyris, 1991; Sutton, 2002).  
· Evade   Objective   Metrics   –  Business   literature   also   notes   that 
innovation antibodies despise corporate metrics, primarily because 
objective facts serve as a constant hindrance to internal political 
manipulation (Davila et al., 2006; Oster, 2008e). Innovation antibodies 
are portrayed as living in a fantasy world where costs and revenue are 
unimportant and customer intimacy confounds their goals. 
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Organizing a corporation for innovation ultimately requires the efforts of 
each individual to be aligned with the fundamental purpose of the organization 
(Labovitz, 1997). Despite significant support and direction and months (or years) 
to internalize the changed environment, some employees cannot or will not change 
(Beer et al., 1990).  There are negative innovation antibodies in many organizations 
who will not end their quiet guerrilla war with the company leaders for power 
(Bennis & Biederman, 1997; Hirshberg, 1998), simply refusing to use their behind-
the-scenes machinations to encourage positive change (Erwin, 2009). When that is 
the case, it is the obligation of senior leadership to act swiftly and surely to 
permanently remove the corporate antibody from the organization (Hirshberg, 
1998; Davila et al., 2006; Beer et al., 1990; Heifitz et al., 2009). 
6. Organizational Sensemaking
The dynamic global marketplace is characterized by informational chaos 
(Gleick, 1987).  An unending deluge of seemingly non-differentiated data buffets 
individuals and organizations.  Perception and prioritization of the data is limited 
by the rational boundaries of those receiving it (Manu, 2007).  When confronted 
with ambiguous information, humans often judge too quickly: incoming facts are 
automatically shaped to fit the preconceptions of those receiving them (Day & 
Schoemaker, 2006). Those biases are based on status, historical experience, 
corporate politics, the “bandwidth” of the receiver, etc. (Day & Schoemaker, 
2006). To recognize, interpret, and act on the weak signals of forthcoming threats 
and opportunities contained in the streams of ongoing events requires intentional 
“sensemaking,” a process involving the interaction of information gathering, 
assignment of meaning, and related responses (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). 
Sensemaking   is   fundamentally   a   series   of   methodologies   for   ordering   and 
extracting meaning from equivocal inputs, for sensing anomalies and enacting 
order into flux (Chia, 2000).  Sensemaking is not about absolute truth or scientific 
accuracy, but is instead about a continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it 
becomes more comprehensive, incorporates additional data, becomes increasingly 
understandable to others, and is more resilient in the face of criticism (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).  Sensemaking allows people to generally understand 
information and circumstances in ways that approximate movement toward general 
long-term goals. Sensemaking  therefore does not focus solely on complete, 
conspicuous,   simple,   written,   significant,   longstanding   concepts.   Instead, 
sensemaking appreciates and makes use of the small, subtle, fleeting, ambiguous, 
fragmentary,   oral   or   visual   information   that   may   ultimately   have   major 
implications for innovation in the organization. An interesting characteristic of 
sensemaking  is that participants interpret incoming  knowledge using trusted 
frameworks,   yet   demonstrate   their   mistrust   of   those   same   frameworks   by 
continually   testing   new   frameworks   and   new   interpretations.   Sensemaking 
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organized and intentionally fed back into the world to make it more orderly 
(Weick, 1979).
An important sensemaking process involves “noticing” and “bracketing.” 
Noticing and bracketing are triggered by the recognition of discrepancies and 
anomalies in the data stream, and are the initial crude acts of simple informational 
categorization.   Concepts   must   be   bracketed   from   an   amorphous   stream   of 
experience and labeled as relevant before additional action can be focused on them 
(Weick et al., 2005). The resultant rough categorization may have several meanings 
but does result in the affixing of a preliminary interpretation and label (Magala, 
1997), so that specific concepts may be more easily communicated between people 
(Chia, 2000).  The primary “filter” used in bracketing is the question of whether an 
idea is plausible.  By using mental models and articulation, the number of possible 
meanings   attached   to   the   bracketed   material   is   reduced   (Obstfeld,   2004). 
Sensemaking is sometimes referred to as an activity that “talks” events, situations, 
environments, and organizations into existence because of the important and 
dynamic role of articulation in the process, and in sensemaking, action and talk are 
cycolinear, with alternation between action and ideas as they are continually 
refined (Weick et al., 2005).
         
 
    Level  Process  Inputs/Outcomes 
Interpretive 
Questions 
     Institutionalizing  Corporate values    
  Leadership  Normalization  Routines 
"What should we 
measure?" 
      Diagnostic systems   
      Rules and procedures   
       
Shared 
understandings    
      Capability   
  Employees  Integration  Mutual adjustment 
"How do we 
accomplish this?" 
      Interactive systems   
      Experimentation   
        Production    
    Intuiting  Experiences   
    Ideation  Images  "What do I see?" 
  Customers    Metaphors   
    Interpreting  Language    
    Elaboration  Cognitive map 
"Does it fit a 
pattern?" 
        Conversation/dialogue    
         
  Adapted from Blackaby & King, 1994; Crossnan, Lane & White, 1999; Nonaka, 1994. 
 
Figure 1  Innovation Sensemaking Antecedents/Process
Innovation is a function of corporate sensemaking. As shown in Figure 1 
above, innovation is not a simple process to be learned and then occasionally 
applied in the workplace. Instead, innovation is a complex  environment  that 
requires clearly delineated objectives, avenues to acquire resources and initiate 
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wherever they lead. As noted in Figure 1, the lines between leadership, employees, and 
customers are highly permeable. The flow of action and information is bi-directional 
and participation in the processes and inputs/outcomes often moves freely among 
leadership, employees, and customers. Sensemaking is ongoing and iterative within 
and between levels. In addition, each input/outcome may be comprised of multiple 
levels. For example, capability can include productive capacity, implicit and explicit 
knowledge, and individual and group motivation. All three levels of innovation 
sensemaking require informal “interloculators,” individuals who name, actively debate, 
and talk through emergent elements of the innovation sensemaking with each other 
(Weick et al., 2005).  
7. The Critical Role of Positive Antibodies in Corporate Innovation
Positive   innovation   antibodies   who   align   their   motivations   and 
methodologies for the good of the organization are crucial to its viability. 
Resistance must be considered a “gift” to be intentionally reviewed, considered 
carefully, and acted upon as necessary (Carlson & Wilmot, 2006). Rather than 
dismissing antibody resistance as irrational and acceptance as rational, resistance in 
the form of comments, complaints, and criticisms provide valuable cues to adjust 
the pace, scope, direction, or sequencing of innovation (Amason, 1996; Schweiger, 
Sandberg, & Rechner, 1989). An absence of or disengagement from innovation 
antibodies may be a sign of future problems resulting from unthinking acceptance 
(Wegener, Petty, Smoak, & Fabrigar, 2004). The foundation of innovation is the 
generation of many widely different ideas (Salk, 1972; Sutton, 2002).  Those ideas 
come from people who are diverse in education, experience, and thought patterns 
(Dyson, 2003), sometimes called “wild ducks” because they are often quirky, 
individualistic, highly intelligent employees who ignore procedures, shun set 
schedules, and resist attempts to make them more efficient (Horibe, 2001). In 
addition to being idiosyncratic, these positive antibodies may lack traditional 
education or credentials and exist on the margins of their professions (Bennis & 
Biederman, 1997).  Like biological antibodies, the divergent viewpoints of positive 
innovation antibodies may be harnessed effectively to recognize, polarize, and 
refine   new   and   potentially   valuable   concepts   flowing   into   the   organization 
(Hirshberg, 1998) while bracketing those that should be rejected (Berkun, 2007; 
Weick et al., 2005). For example, some positive innovation antibodies utilize 
empathic research to ascertain important customer needs not regularly appearing 
on traditional market research reports (Oster, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b; Suri, 2005, 
2006) but absolutely essential to the development of new products, services, ideas, 
environments, or processes for the marketplace. Without positive innovation 
antibodies, organizational sensemaking and innovation are quickly homogenized 
and rapidly decline in effectiveness (Hirshberg, 1998; Weick, 1979, 1995; Kanter, 
1977).
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Corporate   leadership   has   responsibility   for   neutralizing   negative 
innovation antibodies and focusing the energy of positive innovation antibodies 
onto efforts that inform and propel progress within the corporation (Bennis & 
Biederman, 1997; Davila et al., 2006; Hirshberg, 1998; Manu, 2007).  While there 
is   no   uniform  process  that   may   be   communicated   to   guarantee   protracted 
innovation,   the   following   elements   are   crucial   to   the   development   of   an 
environment that is conducive to innovation (Schrage, 1989):
· Hire An Intentionally Diverse Employee Group  – Innovation is 
fueled by innovative ideas, and the only way to get better ideas is to 
get more ideas (Day & Schoemaker, 2006; Salk, 1972). Internally, 
companies must function much like a constructive intellectual arena, 
where new ideas are constantly pitted against each other and the best 
ideas win out (Sutton, 2002). Because only “stupid” questions can 
create new wealth (Hamel, 2002), and those questions reside in the 
heads of employees (Page, 2007), diversity needs to be deeper. The 
acquisition of ideas benefits from a workforce that is intentionally 
diverse (Amabile, 1998;  DePree, 1989; Heifetz et al., 2009;  Page, 
2007),   in   characteristics   such   as   age,   experience,   gender,   race, 
education,   interests,   attitudes,   etc.   which   generates   enthusiasm, 
refreshing   ideas,   and   remarkable   new   opportunities   (Day   & 
Schoemaker, 2006; Gryskiewicz, 1999; Kawasaki, 1999; Schwartz, 
2004; Sutton, 2002). The purpose of hiring is quantitative expansion, 
but   qualitative   expansion,   including   enlarging   the   range   of   a 
company‘s capabilities and the breadth of its vision, is far more 
important (Bennis & Biederman, 1997; Hirschberg, 1998). Innovation 
is substantially enhanced by deliberately seeking divergent pairs of 
employees (Hirschberg, 1998), and selecting employees with a broad 
range   of   backgrounds   and   skills   (Bennis   &   Biederman,   1997; 
Gryskiewicz, 1999; Kelley, 2001, 2005; Skarzynski & Gibson, 2008). 
In addition to diverse capabilities, employees  must  have diverse 
attitudes (Bennis & Biederman, 1997; Hamel, 2002).  Recruits must be 
selected who are slow learners of the organizational code--the history, 
memories,   procedures,   precedents,   rules,   and   assumptions   of   the 
company (Kotter, 1995; Sutton, 2002). For ideas to be generated and 
innovation   to   follow,   it   is   incumbent   on   corporate   leaders   to 
intentionally hire and routinely tolerate what most companies label as 
deviants, heretics, eccentrics, crackpots, weirdos, or just plain original 
thinkers (Horibe, 2001; Sutton, 2002).
· Align  Innovation Efforts  With  Historical  Corporate  Values  - 
Values are constant, passionate, enduring core or central beliefs, 
collectively called a “worldview,” that propel the actions of individuals 
and corporations (Malphurs, 2004; Rokeach, 1973). Personal values 
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experiences, and may be taught or influenced by parents, friends, work 
associates,   religious   organizations,   community,   and   educational 
institutions. Because  personal  values are capable of being openly 
articulated, advocated, exhorted, and defended, they ultimately shape 
organizational values (Rokeach, 1973, 1979; Schein, 1983, 1985). All 
activities of an organization are considered through the lens of the 
corporate values, and values therefore have major import to the long-
term viability and growth of an organization (Malphurs, 2004). Values 
serve as the conceptual foundation upon which individual and group 
life   is   constructed.   Sustainable   innovation  always  aligns   with 
organizational values  (Heifetz et al., 2009; Labovitz, 1997). When 
considering   new   ideas   during   the   process   of   organizational 
sensemaking,   participants   must   decide   if   they   align   with   actual 
organizational values (doctrine) or, in fact, are being compared to non-
essential elements of corporate culture (dogma) (Oster, 2008b, 2009a; 
Zades & Stephens, 2003).  Positive innovation antibodies do not call 
historical corporate values into question. They may, however, actively 
protest innovation that is not aligned with those values (Herbig & Day, 
1992, Taylor, et. al., 2000). 
· Develop   a   Culture   of   Honesty   and  Transparency  –   Honesty, 
transparency, and realism diffuse the actions of negative innovation 
antibodies, and are the responsibility of corporate leaders (Bossidy & 
Charan, 2004; DePree, 1989; Kouzes & Posner, 1993; Gryskiewicz, 
1999;  Heifetz et al., 2009;  Lawrence, 1969). Leaders subsequently 
institutionalize   innovation   environments   through   formal   policies, 
systems, and structures (Beer et al., 1990). Transparency is especially 
important for employees to observe the connection between innovation 
activities and the purpose of the organization (Ford & Ford, 2009). 
Transparency similarly offers employees a sense of belonging to the 
innovative   process,   an   idea   of   how   their   self-interests   will   be 
addressed, and a sense of urgency about the corporate purpose (Beer et 
al., 1990; Guttman, 2008; Kotter, 1995, 1996; Kotter & Schlesinger, 
2008). Because the transparency is for all participants it promotes 
critical evaluation and requisite changes in theories-in-use (Argyris, 
1991).  
· Initiate Frequent and Varied Communications  – As shown in 
Diagram  1,   communications   in   sensemaking   is   iterative   and   bi-
directional. Frequent  communications  using  a broad  spectrum of 
formats is a crucial method to diffuse the efforts of negative innovation 
antibodies by lessening their ability to reinterpret intended messages 
(Guttman,   2008;   Kotter,   1995;   Kotter   &   Schlesinger,   2008). 
Communications   regarding   innovation   efforts   from   leaders   to 
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actions of individual leaders  (Erwin, 2009;  Kotter, 1995, 1996). 
Participants in the sensemaking process include leadership, employees, 
customers, suppliers, competitors, stockholders, trustees, the general 
public,   etc.   (Carlson   &   Wilmot,   2006;   Oster,   2009a;   Zades   & 
Stephens, 2003). Communications may be either explicit or implicit 
when evaluating the compensatory behavior of customers through 
empathic   research   (Nonaka,   1991;   Oster,   2008c;   Suri,   2005). 
Communications with current and potential customers, utilizing low-
cost prototypes, is an especially effective innovation method which 
concomitantly reduces corporate risk (Hamel, 2002; Oster, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c; Rodriguez and Jacoby, 2007a, 2007b; Taylor et al., 
2000; Utterback, 1994). Courageous conversations, no matter how 
strident, can provide important feedback if input is treated with respect 
and candor (Ford & Ford, 2009; Heifetz et al., 2009).
· Enunciate   Aggressive   Objectives   Measured   By   Meaningful 
Metrics  –-   Substantive,   nonlinear   innovation   is  always  led   by 
aggressive, simple, objective metrics aligned with the values, vision, 
strategy, and tactics of the organization (Hamel, 2002). Successful 
innovation leaders embrace the challenge of  quantum  objectives, 
knowing they automatically inspire and require new pathways of 
thought and action (Davila et al., 2006; Hamel, 2002; Kelley, 2001; 
Martin,   2005;  May,  2007;  Heifetz   et   al.,   2009).     Leaders   also 
intentionally fragment the overall objectives into achievable short-term 
stretch objectives (Kotter, 1995). Appropriate metrics promote the 
achievement of value and creativity in the organization at the same 
time (Davila et al., 2006), and balance individual autonomy with 
collective goals (Bennis & Biederman, 1997).
As shown in Figure 2 below, traditional activity-centered innovation is 
built on a specific process because it is the “right thing to do” (Schaffer & 
Thomson, 1992). Corporate objectives (A), the metrics to measure them (B), the 
rules (policies and procedures) to guide them (B), and the capabilities thought to be 
necessary to carry them out (C) are developed by corporate leadership apart from 
the influence of employees and customers. Traditionally, the role of employees is 
to efficiently produce and distribute the products, services, ideas, environments, or 
processes ordained by organizational leadership (D), and then to find customers 
who are willing to exchange money for them (E). Activity-centered innovation 
programs assume that an appropriate process necessarily leads to innovation, and 
that significant upfront investment in training to insure uniform vocabulary, 
competencies, and principles will ultimately lead to successful innovation in some 
distant future (Beer et al., 1990; Schaffer & Thompson, 1992). 
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Figure 2  Innovation Sequencing (Traditional activity-centered)
Source: developed for this research
Conversely,   results-driven   innovation   (Figure   3   below)   begins   with 
leadership and employees jointly establishing significant objectives (AA), and then 
introducing necessary changes  in management styles, work methods, information 
systems, the utilization of underexploited resources, and employee capabilities 
(DD) in a just-in-time mode when (and only when) the change will speed 
achievement of measurable objectives (EE) (Manu, 2007; Schaffer & Thomson, 
1992). This “bottom-up” model has historical precedent in the early years of the 
automobile industry, material production during World War II, and developments 
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experimentation, objective measurement of results, and a race to find practical 
solutions to meet customer needs. This model is foundationally based on the 
contention that employees desire to actively participate in the success of their 
workplace,   that   they   have   the   ability   to   recognize   the   gap   between   their 
competencies and those needed to accomplish corporate objectives, and that they 
can be trusted to acquire and fully employ needed competencies. Customer 
intimacy is paramount, and customers are integral to ideation, experimentation 
(CC), and definition of needs and prospective answers (BB).
              ACTIVITY                          ACTOR INVOLVEMENT
Figure 3  Innovation Sequencing (Contemporary results-driven)
Source: developed for this research
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traditional activity-centered views consider innovation to be a process, 
and   employee   training,   suggested   by   hundreds   of   membership 
associations, professional societies, business journals, and consulting 
firms, is attacked with the same vigor that zero-based budgeting, 
Theory Z, quality circles, and re-engineering were in earlier eras 
(Schrage, 1989). Significant resources are often expended to enhance 
employee competencies without a clear picture of what competencies 
are   actually   needed   to   initiate   successful   corporate   innovation 
(Schaffer & Thomson, 1992). This has been termed the “fallacy of 
programmatic   change"   (Beer   et   al.,   1990).   Innovation   may   not 
subsequently flourish, cynicism may grow among employees, and 
leaders may ultimately abandon innovation efforts (Davila et al., 
2006).  Again, employees may be inoculated against participation in 
future corporate innovation efforts (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008). If, 
however, employees seek and acquire only those competencies that 
emerge as clearly essential to achieve stated organizational objectives 
(Figure 3, DD), they become supportive and energized participants 
because of their recognition and appreciation of the importance of their 
personal contribution to corporate success (Argyris, 1991; DePree, 
1989; Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008). Results-driven innovation throws 
into stark relief the what and why of capabilities acquisition (Beer et 
al., 1990).
· Develop a  Culture  of  Continuous  Experimentation --  Not all 
innovative ideas will be successful, and corporations must value and 
consistently encourage  unusual  ideas  and  small  experiments   that 
sometimes fail (Argyris, 1991; Davila et al., 2006; Hamel, 2002; 
Heifetz, et. al., 2009; Oster, 2008b, 2009a; Spear, 2004).  Failure on 
small,   rapid,   inexpensive,  iterative   hypotheses   and  experiments 
provides highly valuable information (Schwartz, 2004) that may lead 
to answers that substantively meet  customer  needs  (Suri, 2006). 
Developing a corporate prototyping culture is an essential element of 
this experimentation (Brown, 2005).  A prototype, regardless of its 
format,  is not meant  to represent a  final  idea: an explosion of 
prototypes is utilized to acquire and refine many possible ideas on the 
path toward a smaller number of useful ideas (May, 2007). Innovation 
cannot occur unless new combinations of ideas are communicated 
from one person to another (Bennis and Biederman, 1997; von Grogh, 
Ichijo, & Nonaka, 2000), and prototypes are the vehicle for doing so 
(Kawasaki, 1999; Oster, 2009c; Schrage, 2000). Co-creating with 
current and prospective customers requires the subjects to view and 
consider many early prototypes (Figure 3, CC), which they either 
approve or reject along the way (Davila et al., 2006). Prototypes 
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ideas and identify new directions for additional research  (Brown, 
2008). Inexpensive and rapidly developed ‘models’ should be regularly 
produced using paper, computer simulations, clay, foamcore, process 
maps, spreadsheets, bubble charts, videos, digital pictures, or any other 
malleable   material   (Kawasaki,   1999).   Prototypes   help   people   to 
experience a possible future in tangible ways, encouraging them to 
revise their thinking about a particular subject and to ‘try on’ a 
multitude of possibilities (May, 2007; Schrage, 2000). 
· Encourage   Hospitable   Dissent   From   Antibodies   –  Positive 
antibodies   flourish   when   hospitable   dissent   is   routinely   sought, 
accepted, internalized, and acted upon (Bennis & Biederman, 1997; 
Horibe, 2001). Leaders have numerous terms for describing employee 
resistance: pushback, not buying in, criticism, foot-dragging, etc., and 
perceive resistance in a broad spectrum of behaviors--from a direct 
question to a roll of the eyes to overt sabotage (Ford & Ford, 2009). To 
help prevent positive antibodies from changing to negative antibodies 
requires group norms, regular education and communications between 
leaders and employees, as well as appropriate corporate structures 
(Hamel, 2002; Horibe, 2001; Taylor et al., 2000).  
Conclusion
To remain an active and successful participant in the global economy, 
companies require an unending stream of innovative ideas from their employees, 
customers,   partners,   and   external   contacts.   Positive   innovation   antibodies, 
employees who routinely dissent or bring surprising alternative ideas to the table, 
are vitally important to the sensemaking and innovative process (Davila et al., 
2006; Ford & Ford, 2009; Lawrence, 1969). Innovation antibodies should not 
automatically be suppressed or overcome,  but instead should be considered 
candidates for portals to sustainable corporate growth (Larson & Tompkins, 2005; 
Zades & Stephens, 2003). Conversely, recalcitrant negative innovation antibodies 
determined to slow or eliminate innovation and change must be abruptly excised 
from the organization (Kelley, 2005). A revised innovation sequencing model has 
been identified to guide the activities of positive innovation antibodies. Failure to 
appropriately integrate the capabilities and methodologies of positive innovation 
antibodies may negatively impact corporate viability (Gryskiewicz, 1999; Hamel, 
2002).   
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